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ABSTRACT: 
There is much interest among cultural economists in assessing the effects of heritage preservation policies.  
There has been less interest in modeling the policy choices made in historic and cultural landmark 
preservation.  This paper builds an economic model of a landmark designation that highlights the tensions 
between the interests of owners of cultural amenities and the interests of the neighboring community.  We 
perform empirical tests by estimating a discrete choice model for landmark preservation using data from 
Chicago, combining the Chicago Historical Resources Survey of over 17,000 historic structures with 
property sales, Census, and other geographic data.  The data allow us to explain why some properties were 
designated landmarks (or landmark districts) and others were not.  The results identify the influence of 
property characteristics, local socio-economic factors, and measures of historic and cultural quality.  The 
results emphasize the political economy of implementing preservation policies. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1960s, historical preservation policies have been used to protect local 
cultural landmarks, as well as to promote local development.  Landmark designation by 
local governments may have various effects on the value of historical and cultural 
properties and their neighbors.  There has been some interest by academics and policy 
advocates, for instance, in assessing the effects of landmark designation on property 
values, with mixed results.  There has been less interest in modeling the designation 
process itself; but without understanding how designation occurs, making causal 
inferences about historic and cultural preservation policies will be problematic.  This 
paper develops a theoretical model of landmark designation and explores empirical 
determinants of designation using a combination of several rich datasets for buildings in 
Chicago. 
 The theoretical model highlights several key aspects of historic landmark 
preservation policies.  The model highlights the costs and benefits of designation, the 
choice among alternative policy instruments, and how political economic considerations 
affect the preservation decisions of program administrators.  We develop a discrete 
choice model for landmark designation which identifies the determinants of designation.  
Among the determinants tested are a rich array of property characteristics, local 
economic and demographic characteristics, and other geographic variables for the 
property.  Such quantitative methods highlight certain types of determinants while 
leaving the more colorful political process through which designations are proposed, 
considered, and finalized to more qualitative analyses.  The model is applied to data for 
Chicago, combining the Chicago Historical Resources Survey of over 17,000 historic and 
architecturally noteworthy structures in the city with Multiple Listing Service sales data 
for over 70,000 attached-home properties in the city during the 1990s.  The data allow us 
to explain why some properties were designated landmarks (or landmark districts) and 
others were not.  This enables us to better understand the forces that lead to historic 
preservation and local economic development, as well as understand the biases in causal 
inferences about the price effects of historic designation. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses the relevant 
literatures and policy background.  A simple, general theory of the regulation decision is 
developed in the third section, while a fourth section relates the theory to the empirical 
analysis and describes the data we use.  Section V presents the results of the empirical 
analysis, focusing on the policy choice of the historical regulator and the robustness of 
these results to various changes in the model or sample.  A final section concludes. 
2. Literature review and policy background 
 Heritage preservation efforts take many forms.  Sometimes the efforts include 
public or private ownership and a choice to maintain and preserve the resource.  More 
indirect efforts include providing incentives to others for their preservation activities.  
This might include sponsorship or underwriting of an activity (e.g., performing some 
traditional rite, maintaining an aging structure) by private or public funds.  Schuster 
(2002) calls attention to a suite of historic preservation policy tools that he refers to as 
list-based policies.  These include listing, registering, scheduling, and other forms of 
designations in countless national and local heritage preservation lists.   
 Among Schuster’s many interesting observations about list-based policies, a few 
merit emphasis here.  First, lists can serve their preservation ends by many means in 
various contexts.  This includes drawing attention to resources, certification, and enabling 
eligibility for other policy interventions.  This latter set of implications of listing can 
involve positive or negative incentives (sometimes automatic, sometimes contingent on a 
competitive application), different regulatory treatment, or other procedural 
considerations –the origins and implementation of which are often de-coupled from the 
agency or policy process that makes the list in the first place.  Second, these lists of 
heritage resources are large and growing worldwide.  In his 2002 paper, Schuster gives 
examples from France (with 15,000 listed monuments and 31,000 registered 
monuments), the United Kingdom (with 528,383 listed buildings and over 10,000 
conservation areas), United States (with over 1 million historic buildings and 2,300 
National Historic Landmarks), and UNESCO’s World Heritage List (with 721 sites in 
2001 and now boasts 851 properties).  There is much concern about the designation 
process itself, the criteria for listing, and the possibility of congestion or crowding-out on 
the list.  Understanding the impacts of historic designation policies presents an important 
challenge given the scope of these lists and numerous governing authorities (e.g., the U.S. 
alone hosts over 2,000 local historic district commissions).  
 Scholarly research on historic designations remains fairly limited, although the 
collection of property price studies has grown.  Using the policy’s effects on property 
prices as a prominent indicator of value, several studies have explored the effects of 
historical quality and local and national historic designation programs.  Readers are 
pointed to an extensive literature review by Mason (2005) and a somewhat dated Listokin 
and Lahr (1997) report.   More recently, studies by Coulson and Leichenko (2004), 
Coulson and Lahr (2005), Cyrenne et al. (2006), and Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2009) add to 
this growing literature.  Recently, Noonan (2007) provides a study of Chicago’s 
landmarks program, the focus of this research.  The broader literature on the economics 
of historic preservation features widely varying research quality coupled with a fairly 
narrow focus on price effects.   
Surprisingly, perhaps, little or no attention has been paid to the “supply effects” or 
impact of these policies on actual conservation or preservation.  The attention paid to 
“own-price” effects of designation has struggled to resolve or even address important 
issues of measurement (e.g., use of appraisal data, use of neighborhood aggregates) and 
identification (e.g., is designation exogenous, is preexisting historical quality captured).  
The academic literature recognizes some of these problems and, especially, the likely 
heterogeneity across jurisdictions.  While discussions of historic designation policies 
often reference asymmetric information and the importance of “certification” (e.g., 
Schuster 2002), a theoretical model has yet to be applied and empirical evidence of this 
effect remains elusive.  Moreover, analysts have suggested that historic preservation may 
benefit neighborhoods by both catalyzing revitalization of neighboring areas (e.g., 
Coulson and Leichenko 2001; Listokin, Listokin, and Lahr 1998) and stabilizing 
neighborhoods thus reducing investment risks.  Little direct evidence of these effects has 
been offered, although Noonan (2007) does show in his repeat-sales data that housing 
units in landmark buildings are actually more likely to be sold multiple times in the 1990s 
than comparable units.   
 To date, however, very little has been said about the determinants of designation 
in the first instance – and even less has been done to empirically describe why we 
preserve what is preserved.  Accordingly, efforts to measure or assess causal impacts of 
these heritage preservation policies remain unconvincing.  This paper seeks to remedy 
this oversight. 
3. Theoretical Model 
 This section presents an “as if” model of the designation choice which abstracts 
away from many of the details of the actual designation process.  Such a model highlights 
some of the important factors in designating properties.  We imagine a historic 
preservation regulator maximizing his administrative utility function with respect to the 
restrictiveness of his preservation interventions, r, which we model as positive and 
continuous.1  The regulator has direct preferences over r and the utilities of the property 
owner (P) and of other affected stakeholders or neighbors (N).  Thus, the administrator 
will choose the restrictiveness of his intervention into the property market (his 
preservation policy) in order to maximize: 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )( ); ; , ; , ;u r z U P r z N r z r z= , 
where UN, UP > 0 and Ur < 0.  The regulator’s utility is rising in the welfare of the 
(regulated) property owner and in the welfare of the neighbors.  This is the case because 
he cares about high property values or because residents apply political and 
administrative pressure on the administrator to increase their own utility.  The 
administrator balances the property owners and neighbors’ opposing interests in 
restrictiveness.  Property owners prefer to have fewer restrictions (Pr < 0) in order to 
preserve the option of redevelopment.  Neighbors favor more restrictions (Nr > 0), 
1 Although preservation of buildings or other structures is the primary focus of this paper, the model can be 
readily extended to preservation of other heritage resources, such as artwork or cultural landscapes.  The 
core idea – that a regulator balances interests of the owners (who enjoy options to transform or dispose of 
the resource) and some external constituency who receives a positive externality from that resource – holds 
across a variety of cultural applications. 
                                                 
assuming those restrictions do not restrict their own options.  Neighbors are expected to 
value restrictions on their neighbors because this reduces the risk of attractive properties 
being redeveloped in undesirable ways.  The direct preferences over the restrictiveness 
arise from administrative costs of the program such as the costs of monitoring and 
enforcing compliance.  The first-order direct and indirect preferences over the exogenous 
factors2 z will not be important to the model because they are not choice variables for the 
administrator.  The role of the second-order effects will be important below.   
  The administrator optimizes on a property-by-property basis by setting the 
marginal utility of restrictiveness to zero: 
(2) ( , ) 0P r N r rF r z U P U N U= + + = . 
For interior solutions, equation 2 holds at the optimum and thus implicitly defines r* (the 
optimal restrictiveness) as a function of z.  We also assume that the second-order 
condition (that Fr < 0) is satisfied so that equation 2 implicitly defines r*(z) as the utility-
maximizing level of restrictiveness.  Using the implicit function rule we can derive the 
partial effects of any of these exogenous characteristics on the optimal level of restriction, 
r*: 
(3)  ( )
*
/P rz N rz rz
r U P U N U D
z
∂
= − + +
∂
 
where r P rr N rr rrD F U P U N U= = + + < 0 is implied by the assumption that the second-
order condition is satisfied.3 
2 These exogenous factors will include characteristics of individual properties, owners, or neighborhoods 
and will be discussed below.  The direct and indirect preferences will vary depending on which exogenous 
factor is considered.   
3 A sufficient condition for this condition to hold are that administrative costs increase more-than-linearly, 
that the added benefit to neighbors is decreasing in restrictiveness, and that the costs imposed on property 
owners by restrictions increases about linearly.  
                                                 
 Equation 3 helps us understand how independent variation in a host of exogenous 
neighborhood or property characteristics will affect the optimal level of restrictiveness.  
In general, such a factor will increase the level of restrictiveness whenever 
P rz N rz rzU P U N U+ + > 0, which means that it increases the marginal utility of 
restrictiveness.  The term is basically the sum of the effect of z on the marginal utilities of 
each stakeholder, weighted by the administrator’s weight of each stakeholder’s utility.  
To flesh out this condition, we examine some examples of such variables. 
 Some characteristics of the property affect only the property owners.  Such a 
characteristic might be the value of a property after potential redevelopment.  This 
increases the owner’s utility by increasing the value of the property, but should not affect 
the neighbors.  Owners of structures with more redevelopment-related option value will 
likely have their utility more adversely affected by additional restrictions (UPPrz < 0), 
while this factor will likely have little effect on the marginal utility of restrictions to the 
administrator.  Thus, the model predicts that factors making potential redevelopment 
more profitable will decrease the optimal level of restrictions.   
 Some factors will affect neighbors but not property owners.  One such element of 
z is the negative externalities that would be created if the structure was redeveloped.  For 
instance, if the likely post-redevelopment use of a historic apartment building is a gas 
station, neighbors will likely value restrictions even more than if the post-redevelopment 
use is a library or housing.  If z is “negative externality associated with redevelopment,” 
UNNrz > 0, while the other cross-partials will be near zero.  Thus, the model predicts that 
restrictions will increase when the future use of properties will bring more negative 
externalities.  
 The historic nature of the property might both decrease the property owner’s 
utility (outdated structural characteristics, Pz < 0) but increase neighbors’ utility (rare 
architectural style, Nz > 0).  Higher restrictions will tend to make living in a historic 
property worse (Prz < 0, because modifications will be more difficult), but also make its 
external effect on neighbors more positive (Nrz ≥ 0, because reduced uncertainty about the 
persistence of the positive externalities will benefit risk-averse neighbors). The effect on 
the costs of regulating will be indeterminate because there is nothing inherent about the 
historic nature that makes the restrictions harder to administer ( 0rzU ≈ ). From this, the 
effect of historical quality on protection or preservation is ambiguous.  Neighbors might 
want more restrictions for historic properties, but owners will be more resistant to these 
restrictions. 
 Factors other than the property’s own historic qualities might make the difference.  
For a given level of historic value, the preservation of a property in a more historic 
neighborhood (with many historic properties) might not add very much to neighbors’ 
utility (i.e., Nz  and Nrz will be smaller in more historic neighborhoods), and less 
regulation will be expected.  If the historic property stands out, say, because it is old 
compared to the rest of the neighborhood, the opposite holds, and regulation might be 
more stringent.  Similarly, for a given amount of historic significance, a more culturally 
significant structure will have higher optimal restrictions.  Higher incomes might increase 
people’s valuation of flows of historic externalities or increase their ability to pressure the 
regulator (increase UNNrz). 
 Two common features of historic preservation policy are that regulation is limited 
to a few discrete choices, and that protected properties can be bundled together into 
landmark districts.  Our model allows for such group designations, but this is a detail 
away from which we have abstracted considerably.  If an administrator can only make 
group designation decisions, the optimization problem above is subtly altered.  Landmark 
districts offer administrators another choice in the policy instrument with which they 
approach the preservation decision.  For group or district designations, the neighbors and 
the property owners are groups which substantially overlap, suggesting that the effects of 
income and other demographic factors on the optimal restrictiveness could differ 
markedly from individual property regulations.  Similarly, the effect of the nearness of 
additional historic properties in the vicinity (which lowered the level of individual 
restrictions) might increase the level of group restrictions since imposing group 
restrictions might have lower marginal costs per unit to the administrator.  Because the 
determinants of group designation and individual designation can differ so markedly, the 
optimal level of restrictions will also differ depending on the type of designation.  Thus, 
for a given structure, there will be one optimal level of restrictions for the case of 
individual building designations, rb*( z), and a different level of restrictiveness for district 
designations, rd*( z).  
 Our model adjusts readily to the mostly discrete nature of preservation policy.  In 
the empirical section to follow, the continuous r* terms from the model become latent 
variables in logit regressions, so that designation will occur whenever r* exceeds some 
cut-off value.  Faced with three regulation possibilities (leave the property alone, 
designate it as part of a district, or designate it as an individual building), the 
administrator will choose the one that yields the highest utility.  The two types of 
designations also confer eligibility for different incentive programs (such property or 
income tax reductions, zoning variances and technical assistance).  Thus, our multinomial 
logit analysis will take the district/individual distinction as the primary discrete choice 
faced by administrators.    
4. Data and empirical model 
4.1.  Empirical model 
 In the theoretical model above, the utility the administrator receives from 
regulating any structure, i, according to the optimal regulation for policy instrument c is 
given by: 
(4) ( )( )*ic c i icu U r z ε= + , 
where εic is a random error term following a type-I extreme value distribution and c can 
be either no regulation (n), district designation (d) or building designation (b).  For our 
statistical analysis, we assume that  
(5) ( )( )* 0c i c zc i icU r z zβ β ε= + + . 
If the administrator always chooses the option yielding the highest utility, the probability 
that he chooses any given preservation policy, pi for a given structure is given by: 
(6) 
0
0
Pr( )
1
c zc i ic
c zc i ic
z
i z
c
ep c
e
β β ε
β β ε
+ +
+ += = +∑
 
for c=d, b.4  We estimate these empirical equations via maximum likelihood.   
 We also perform an analysis of the district designation decisions using standard 
logistic regressions.  There: 
4 For policy instrument c = n, or no regulation, the probability of being unregulated is set to be equal to 
equation (6) with the numerator replaced with 1. 
                                                 
(7) Pr (c=d |  z)  = Pr (rd*(z) > 0 |  z) 
   = Pr (β0+ βzz+ ε2 > 0|  z) 
These models are important in terms of checking the robustness of our results, and 
interesting in their own right.  Because of the rarity of individual designations, we are not 
able to control for large amounts of structural and neighbor characteristics in our 
multinomial logit analysis.  Thus, we assess the robustness of the coefficients in the 
district-only models, and discuss them in light of the results from the multinomial logit 
models.   
4.2.  Data 
 The empirical analysis combines many data sources.  The City of Chicago’s 
Landmarks Division in its Department of Planning and Development provides 
information on the landmarks (City of Chicago 2004).  Information such as the addresses, 
dates of construction and designation, architect and architectural style, and historic 
themes are available for the 217 individual landmarks and 43 historic districts 
(comprising over 4,500 properties) in the city.  These data provide us with the dependent 
variables of our empirical analysis, which is designation during the 1990’s. 
 Combined with the official landmarks data is the Chicago Historical Resources 
Survey (CHRS).  Starting in 1983, historians from the Landmarks Commission 
inventoried the half million structures in Chicago’s city limits (Commission on Chicago 
Landmarks 1996).  Commission on Chicago Landmarks (1996) describes the 
methodology in greater detail.  Ultimately, the fieldwork obtained detailed information 
from a final sample of 17,366 historically and/or culturally significant properties.  The 
CHRS data contains information on addresses, architects, significance and maintenance, 
and construction dates (http://www.cityofchicago.org/Landmarks/CHRS.html). The 
analysis also uses a variety of other geographic data for the city including Chicago’s 
community areas and Census TIGER files.  To link properties to their block-group level 
Census variables, the Geolytics™ dataset is employed to produce boundary-constant 
neighborhood demographics for 1980-2000.  
 To examine which properties are more likely to be designated as landmarks, 
ideally data on the population or a random sample of Chicago properties would be used.  
No such dataset is available, however.  Timely citywide property inventories with 
sufficient detail are generally not maintained.  Lacking an available and ideal random 
sample, this paper examines two different samples of Chicago properties.  The first is the 
sample of properties in the CHRS mentioned above.  The CHRS might be thought of as a 
deliberate oversample of old, historically or culturally significant, and likely-to-become 
designated properties.  The second is a set of all single-family attached houses (e.g., 
condos, townhomes) that were sold via the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) from1990-
2000.  While neither of these samples are the ideal, they both represent relevant sub-
populations of structures. 
 A few differences between the CHRS and MLS datasets should be noted.  The 
CHRS functions like cross-sectional inventory of historic properties in the city because 
the date each observation was taken is unknown.  The MLS data, on the other hand, offer 
true time-series data on property sales over the course of a decade.  This analysis 
establishes a baseline in 1990, exactly the start of the MLS data range and near to the end 
of the CHRS surveying effort.5  Table A1 in the Appendix provides definitions for 
5 Because of data limitations, we assume that CHRS data were collected by 1990.  For CHRS properties 
surveyed after 1990, it is possible an endogeneity or sample selection bias might occur.  The dependent 
variable (post-1990 designation status) might influence the independent variables from the CHRS dataset or 
even the likelihood of inclusion in the CHRS.  If designated properties are more likely to be included, then 
                                                 
variables used in the analysis and indicates from which datasets they derive.  Summary 
statistics for the two samples of properties (CHRS and MLS) can be seen in Table A2. 
 In the theoretical model, all independent variables are collapsed into one variable, 
z.  The discussion of the model considered various interpretations of that variable, 
including the historic nature of the structure, its cultural significance, its historic or 
cultural built environment and the income and other demographic characteristics of its 
neighborhood.  The CHRS includes a set of color codes which contain some information 
on the historic or cultural significance.  Red and Orange are the two codes used to 
describe nationally or locally significant structures, respectively.  Colors further along the 
spectrum correspond – roughly – to less and less significant properties, with Blue and 
Purple assigned to structures with no significance, extensive alterations, or of such recent 
construction as to make their significance difficult to assess.  Our other measure of 
historical significance is simply the year the structure’s construction was begun (begun), 
along with an interaction of this variable with its location within the zone affect by the 
Great Chicago Fire of 1871 (FireBegun).6  We also use a set of geographic variables to 
control for location in the Great Fire zone and for distance to the center of downtown 
Chicago, to water features, to industrial corridors, and to one of Chicago’s historic 
boulevards.  The latitude of the structure controls for location in the north side of the city.  
inferences drawn from estimates using this sample may not be valid for the broader population of 
structures.  For instance, oversampling designated-but-low-quality buildings might artificially lower the 
estimated effect of quality of designation.  If designation status affects how surveyors recorded property 
information – or affected the building attributes directly – then classic endogeneity occurs.  For example, 
designated buildings might receive higher quality scores than they would have without the prestige of 
designation, biasing upwards the estimated effect of quality on designation. 
6 The Great Chicago Fire of 1871 devastated much of the city core at the time, forcing a virtual rebuilding 
of this portion of the city.  This puts an upper limit on building age in that area.  Because the begun variable 
is missing for many observations, begun is coded with a 0 for all missing observations and a dummy 
variable (nobegun) is included to capture the mean effect of those buildings with missing begin values.  See 
Alberini and Longo (2006) for an application of this approach. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Other controls for building characteristics include the purpose of the structure 
(residential, commercial or other).  Whether the CHRS property had a known tenant at 
the time of the survey (tenant) is also included as a proxy for lobbying interest and 
capacity.  Actively used buildings may be better able to resist designation than vacant 
ones, just as purpose might indicate different owner interests.   
 Our proxies of cultural significance in the CHRS data are a set of dummy 
variables describing the extent to which information about the structure was known.  
These included dummy variables for whether the building was named (e.g., “the Robie 
House”), whether the architect was known, whether the building was assigned a specific 
type, or details, or described as an example of a particular architectural style.  The historic 
or cultural environment is measured by a set of variables for the median year of 
construction in the structure’s census block group (MedYear), the stock of pre-1990 
designated landmarks in the block group (CountLmk), the percentage of the 1980 stock of 
pre-war housing that was demolished during the 1980’s (PerOldLost) and the number of 
CHRS properties within a half mile of the structure (CountCHRS).   
 Finally, we have a set of neighborhood demographic variables.  These include the 
average income (lnInc), rent (lnRent) and the logged population density (lnPopDen) in 
our most basic models.  In more fully specified models, we have included variables for 
the percent of the population with college degrees (perCol), the percent without high 
school degrees (perDrop), the percent of the population that is non-Hispanic, white 
(perWhite), and the percent of the households with incomes below 150% of the official 
poverty line (perPoor).   
 Many of these variables are not available in the MLS data, except for structures 
that happen to be in both data sets.  The MLS does offer a host of other structure 
variables which we use, including the square footage (Area), number of units in the 
building (units), the number of rooms, bedrooms and bathrooms (rooms, bedrms, and 
baths, respectively), the presence of a fireplace (firepl) or parking spot (parking) and the 
year of sale (saleyr).  When analyzing the MLS data, we also include controls for 
whether the property was deemed culturally significant enough to be included in the 
CHRS and some of the CHRS variables.   
 Our two dependent variables are whether the structure (or unit) was designated as 
an individual landmark or included in a new historic district after 1990.  While pre-1990 
designation information is readily available, there is the chance that the designation status 
could have affected the assessment of significance in or inclusion in the CHRS.  Thus, by 
looking only at properties designated after the CHRS sample was selected, we choose a 
dependent variable that is safer from concerns about endogeneity. 
5. Results 
 Table 1 presents the averages of the various outcome variables for the two data 
sets to give a sense of the extent of the programs.  We see that in both samples post-1990 
landmark designations are relatively rare.  Such late designations make up only five 
percent of the CHRS sample (compared to 14% pre-1990 designations) and only about 
one percent of the MLS sample (compared to about 2.5% for pre-1990 designations).  A 
much greater number of landmarks were designated before 1990.  About five percent of 
the MLS sample is also in the CHRS sample, comprising about 3,600 observations.  
Among these CHRS observations in the MLS data set, nearly 20 percent are in landmark 
districts, and nearly seven percent were included in districts after 1990.   
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 The rest of this empirical section is split into three parts.  First, using the CHRS 
data we present the "policy choice" model, where administrators choose whether to 
regulate, and how.  In section 5.2, we add additional variables to the district model to 
assess the robustness of the estimated coefficients to the inclusion of additional 
explanatory variables.  Section 5.3 compares the estimated coefficients from the CHRS 
district model to a comparable set of results using the MLS data, and adds some 
additional variables to the models using MLS data to assess how robust the estimated 
coefficients are to included variables. 
5.1. Policy Choice 
 Table 2 reports the coefficients from the multinomial logit estimation of a model 
where administrators can assign a structure either no additional restriction (beyond city 
zoning and state and federal historical protections), include it in a district, or single out 
the structure for individual designation.7  The top panel of Table 2 reports the coefficients 
for the individual designations (relative to no designation at all), and the bottom panel 
reports coefficients for district designations (relative to no designation at all).  Model 1 in 
Table 2 starts with a basic specification.  Model 2 adds prior changes in neighborhood 
demographics in the middle column. A parsimonious model is specified because of the 
rarity of the ‘individual designation’ policy choice.   
7 Strictly speaking, the model predicts whether structures are not designated, designated in a district, or 
individually designated at some point after 1990.  Because a structure that was designated prior to 1990 
cannot, in general, be re-designated during the 1990’s, we drop these structures form the data set in all the 
regressions reported here.  
                                                 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 Several variables have qualitatively similar coefficients across the two types of 
designation.  These include the historical color codes (-),the variables for whether the 
structure was named (+) or had a tenant (-), neighborhood rent levels (+), population 
density (+), whether the structure was in the zone affected by the Great Chicago Fire of 
1871 (+) and whether the structure was a residential property (-).8  That historical quality 
appears negatively related to the likelihood of historic designation is one of the more 
remarkable results for this analysis.  The interpretation of the color code results are 
discussed in more detail below.  There are several coefficients that differ between 
designation types.  Some of the less interesting ones include the distance to the center of 
downtown and whether the property had a commercial use (both are insignificant for 
individual designations, significant and negative for districts). 
 Some important variables’ coefficients differ markedly by designation type.  The 
negative coefficient on neighborhood income for district designation (relative to no 
designation) is significantly different from the smaller, insignificant negative coefficient 
for individual designation.  If historic and cultural preservation is a normal good, these 
results are somewhat surprising.  They suggest that individuals in high income 
neighborhoods do not want the restrictions placed on their own homes, and have the 
incentive and wherewithal to prevent such designations.  The much smaller coefficient 
for income for the individual designation choice suggests that this incentive does not 
prevent the restrictions from being placed on their neighbors through individual 
designation, but neighborhood income does matter when the restrictions threaten their 
8 Some of these coefficients are insignificant for one of the designation types and not statistically different 
from one another at conventional levels.  In those cases, we report the sign of the significant coefficient. 
                                                 
own options through district designations.  Similarly, increases in rents over the 1980’s 
have significantly different effects in the two models, with negative effects on individual 
designation and positive or insignificant effects on district inclusion.   
 Another interesting difference in determinants is that of the date at which 
construction of the structure was begun.  Newer structures are significantly less likely to 
be individually designated (relative to no designation at all), as expected.  The effect of 
age on inclusion in a landmark district (rather than not designated at all) is non-existent.  
The difference in the coefficients is significant in Model 2.  That individual structural age 
is important in determining individual designation but unimportant in determining 
inclusion in a district squares with intuition and the model: many non-historic properties 
are included in districts in order to minimize administrative costs, not to preserve them 
per se.  Similar differences in coefficients also exist for the interaction between structure 
age and the Great Chicago Fire area.   
 Also differing between the individual and district determinants are the coefficients 
for the cultural environmental variables.  These four variables are always statistically 
different from one another across designation types, and of opposite sign.  They show 
that, conditional on a building’s age, buildings in older neighborhoods (with smaller 
MedYear) are more likely to be designated as districts than individually, and vice versa.   
The percent of older homes demolished during the 1980’s (PerOldLost), or the depletion 
of a neighborhood’s historic or cultural resources, makes district designation less likely, 
as expected.  It also makes the remaining buildings more likely to be singled out rather 
than be put in a district. Having additional protected landmarks in the vicinity 
(CountLmk) has an insignificant coefficient for individual designation relative to no 
designation, but makes district designation less likely relative to either alternative.  The 
presence of multiple landmarks makes additional district preservation policy unneeded.  
Finally, the presence of more historic properties in the vicinity (CountCHRS) makes 
individual designation less likely (the structure will not be as special in the 
neighborhood) but makes district designation more likely (there is more heritage to 
preserve).  These variables flesh out the decision criteria that administrators use in 
deciding whether to preserve and how to preserve.   
 These results show that the forces at work in the preservation of cultural resources 
cause administrators to pick and choose target properties, and to adjust the policy 
instrument to the case at hand, in ways consistent with the model.  These decisions 
depend on the neighborhood context (demographic, economic and cultural) as well as the 
properties of the individual structure.  Individual designations tend to happen to older 
properties in less historic neighborhoods, while districts tend to be in poorer 
neighborhoods with more historical resources.  
5.2. District models 
 Because of the small number of individual designations after 1990, the 
multinomial logit analysis above restricts itself to a limited set of explanatory variables.  
We now turn to an analysis solely of the choice to designate a property in a district or not.  
The greater frequency with which properties become included in a district allows us to 
include a larger set of explanatory variables, examine these new variables’ coefficients 
and assess how stable the relationships described in part 5.1 are in the face of additional 
controls.  Table 3 presents these results.  The first column of results presents coefficients 
of a logit regression with additional color codes added, and shows that there are no 
qualitative changes from the multinomial logit models in Table 2.  The next column 
includes some additional building details, while a third incorporates more geographic 
information.  The rightmost column of results adds additional demographic and 
demographic trend variables.  The inclusion of these variables makes some of the 
already-included variables’ coefficients change sign. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 The coefficients of added building characteristics generally show that having 
more information about a building makes it more likely to be designated.  These building 
characteristics are our main proxy of cultural significance, so these results suggest (along 
with those results in Table 2) that more culturally significant buildings (e.g., greater fame 
or notoriety of the building or its architect, representativeness of its architectural style) 
are more likely to be designated, as the theory predicts.  Adding these variables to the 
model causes the named and Fire coefficients to become insignificant, and the residential 
use dummy variable coefficient to become significantly negative.  Also, including these 
cultural variables makes the begun variable become significantly negative.  The 
construction date’s insignificance in the model with fewer cultural significance measures 
shows that the interplay between a building’s cultural and historical significance is 
important.  Landmark designations in Chicago appear to be about more than just history – 
cultural dimensions matter as well, and the effects of one may mask the other in an 
improperly specified model. 
 Adding the geographic information shows that a more northern location is 
associated with a greater likelihood of district designation, as does being located further 
away from industrial corridors or bodies of water (e.g., Lake Michigan, Chicago River).  
Adding these variables causes the Fire dummy variable to become significantly negative 
along with the dummy for having no information about construction dates, but the 
residential use variable goes back to positive.  Furthermore, these geographic variables 
drive the 1990 rental rates coefficient and the percent of lost old residences coefficient 
into insignificance.  It would be difficult to generalize much from the effect of these 
geographic controls on the other variables.  The geographic coefficients as well as their 
effects on the other coefficients says more about the specific historical development of 
the city of Chicago than anything else.   
 Finally, the additional demographic information yields a positive association with 
the percent white in 1990 and the 1980-1990 change in the percent college educated.  The 
percent college educated in 1990, the changes in the poverty rate and percent white over 
the 1980’s are all associated with lower probability of being designated.  Adding these 
variables has big effects on the previously-included demographic variables, as might be 
expected.  When the new demographic variables are added, 1990 rental rates and the 
change in neighborhood income from 1980-1990 become significant and negative, while 
1990 neighborhood income levels becomes insignificant, as does the dummy variable for 
whether the CHRS data set included information on the style of the structure.  However, 
the percentage of older homes demolished during the 1980’s becomes significantly 
negative again, as in previous models.     
 The three demographic variables which change signs in the presence of the new 
demographic controls (lnRent, lnInc and dlnInc) might be expected to change sign in the 
presence of the additional demographic controls.  For instance, while income changes 
sign from negative to positive, it is only in the presence of the strong negative coefficient 
of the college variable that this occurs. The same is true for the switch of the coefficient 
on income changes and the sign of the coefficient of changes in college education: the 
income variable changes sign, but only in the presence of the new college variable, which 
takes the sign that the income variable had in the college variable’s absence.  The 
interpretations loaded on the income variable in part 5.1 could thus now be leveled on a 
“class” variable, as represented by the college education levels in the neighborhood, and 
these results support the idea that education, class and the cultural tastes and attitudes 
associated with them are more important than income per se.9   
 While the signs of some of these coefficients are interesting in their own right, 
another point of this exercise has been to assess the robustness of the conclusions from 
part 5.1.  Comparing the first and last columns of Table 3 gives a sense of which 
coefficients changed.  In general, the color codes, geographical variables (except for the 
Fire variable) and the building information show fairly stable results across all these 
models.  While some variables change significance, only three (Fire, lnRent and dlnInc) 
go from significant in one direction to significant in another because of the addition of 
control variables.   
 The most important and robust set of results are those relating to the historical and 
cultural environment that these structures inhabit.  In almost every model, these variables 
retain their sign and significance, telling a consistent story.  Structures in newer 
neighborhoods are less likely to be included in a district (recall, however, that they were 
more likely to be individually designated), as are structures in neighborhoods that have 
9 The connection between income and education as determinants of demand for heritage preservation, and 
cultural goods in general, is discussed in greater detail elsewhere (e.g., Bourdieau 1984).  This is another 
instance of education being a better predictor of cultural demand than income (e.g., Heilbrun and Gray 
2001, Whitehead and Finney 2003, Alberini and Longo 2006).    
                                                 
lost substantial percentages of their older, more culturally significant structures, or where 
there already exists substantial amounts of protected culturally significant properties.  
However, properties near a higher density of significant buildings (those with more 
CHRS properties in the vicinity) are more likely to be designated as a district to preserve 
that dense cultural fabric.10  So, while the results are fairly robust in general, with respect 
to the historical and cultural environmental variables, they are extremely robust.  The 
variables describing the structure’s own cultural significance (named, architect, typed, 
styled, detailed) are also quite robust, reinforcing the message from the multinomial 
analysis that more culturally significant structures are more likely to be designated in 
districts, holding the historic significance and other factors constant. 
5.3. Comparing MLS and CHRS results 
 The sampling of primarily historic properties in the CHRS data offers an 
interesting population to examine.  However, because the CHRS data does not represent 
anything like a random sample of properties in a city, the ability to generalize the results 
cannot be taken for granted.  Here we compare the results obtained from the CHRS data 
set with results from a MLS data set comprising all sales listed in the Multiple Listing 
Service of single-family attached housing in Chicago over the 1990's.  Comparing results 
between the MLS sample and the CHRS sample gives us a sense of the sensitivity of our 
findings to sample selection.  While neither of these samples is ideal (the CHRS is too 
concentrated on more historic structures while the MLS is too concentrated on residential 
sales) consistency of estimates across samples reassures us of the strength of the 
10 If CountCHRS distinguished between red and orange CHRS properties and other CHRS properties, the 
unrestricted model above would show (not reported here) that it is count of red and orange properties 
nearby that drives this effect.   
                                                 
relationships we are uncovering here.  Table 4 shows results for very similar models 
using the CHRS data and the MLS data in the first two columns.  It is worth noting that 
when one restricts the MLS sample to have similar structure age profile to the CHRS 
(looking only at buildings built before 1974), the results do not change substantively. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 Focusing on the changes that happen as we move from the CHRS to the MLS 
sample, we see that some coefficients change sign, although only two (lnInc and 
lnPopDen) change sign significantly (that is, from significantly positive to significantly 
negative).  In the CHRS sample, increases in population density are negatively associated 
with district designation, while they are positively associated with designation in the 
MLS sample.  The median income in 1990 also changes from significantly negative to 
significantly positive as we change samples.  However, this variable had slightly unstable 
coefficients across specifications in the CHRS sample as well.  These are very important 
neighborhood indicators as one represents population growth and the other offers a fair 
proxy for the economic status of the neighborhood.   Several other variables change sign, 
but never from significant in one direction to significant in another direction.  Of the 28 
variables included in the equation, only 7 show instability, and 21 retain the same sign 
and significance regardless of the sample.  Throughout the paper, we have focused on the 
coefficients on the variables measuring the historical and cultural environment of the 
structure.  One of these variables (PerOldLost) becomes insignificant in the MLS 
sample.11  The rest of the interesting historical environment variables are consistent with 
what came before.   
11 Interestingly, the percentage of old housing lost during the 1990s is positive and significant when 
included in a similar regression.  Because this variable is endogenous, we do not report any such 
                                                 
 The last two columns of results in Table 4 use the MLS sample, but add control 
variables.  We add a number of individual structural characteristics available in the MLS 
data, but not in the CHRS.  Of these, the living area is positively associated with district 
designation while the number of bathrooms, access to a parking space, and the year of 
sale are negatively associated with district designation.  The last of these coefficients 
suggests that attached housing sales are increasingly in non-landmark districts over the 
1990s.  The size of the building (units) is inversely related to the likelihood of district 
designation throughout its range in both the last two columns.  The addition of the unit 
characteristics also drives the CountLmk coefficient insignificant, although it retains its 
negative sign.  As with the change in significance of PerOldLost, it is important to 
remember that this coefficient pertains holding the median age of neighboring structures 
and the number of nearby CHRS properties constant.   
 The negative coefficient for certain color codes (e.g., orange) remains in the MLS 
sample.  This unexpected result suggests several possible explanations.  First, most of the 
most significant heritage resources were already designated landmarks by 1990.  The 
“orange” properties not already designated in the first 22 years of the program likely 
remain undesignated for some other reason.  It might be some unobservable factor (e.g., 
existing easements, politically powerful owners) that either makes their designation too 
costly or redundant.  After the administrator has already “cherry-picked”, properties of 
less-significant color codes (which lack these unobservable factors) appear more likely to 
become designated.  Second, at least for the properties not yet designated by 1990, the 
regressions here.  Its significance could be interpreted cynically (that preservation policies lead owners to 
demolish houses).  Another interpretation is that high rates of demolition increase the demand for 
preservation by neighbors, leading administrators to preserve areas “threatened” by development.  Much 
hinges on the timing of the preservation and the demolition, which we cannot address here.   
                                                                                                                                                 
coding criteria in the CHRS apparently diverge substantially from the many factors (e.g., 
history, culture, economic development, art, aesthetics) considered by Landmarks 
Commission in Chicago (2007).  The CHRS measure for quality need not be the same as 
subsequently used by the administrator.  Third, and related to the first two, is that the 
effects in Tables 2 – 4 are conditional on other control variables.  For CHRS structures, 
individual designations are significantly and positively (unconditionally) correlated with 
red and yellow properties, significantly negatively correlated with green, and not 
significantly correlated with orange (the modal category).  Finally, for codes other than 
red or orange (the most significant codes), the codes partly reflect modifications that 
have occurred to the property.  The historic-but-modified property may be more likely 
than historic-and-authentic to merit designation of any sort because the modification may 
signal that the remaining heritage resource is at greater risk (raising Nr) or may signal that 
the owner has already made the desired modernization (lowering Pr).    
 In general, moving form the CHRS to the MLS does not create large changes in 
the estimated coefficients.  Comparing the first column of results in Table 4 with the last, 
we see that of the 28 common coefficients between the MLS and CHRS datasets, only 
nine change, and only two change from significant in one direction to significant in 
another.  While two of our four historical and cultural environmental variables become 
insignificant, they retain their sign.  Furthermore, the proxies for historic value (the color 
codes and begun) are generally robust, as is our proxy for cultural significance (named, 
although it is important to keep in mind that this variable depends on MLS observations 
that overlap with the CHRS dataset, so its consistency should not be surprising).  All in 
all, the results paint a broadly consistent picture of the designation process across 
specifications and across samples.   
6. Conclusions 
 This paper endeavors to shed light on the process of historical and heritage 
preservation, using the case of Chicago’s landmarks program.  To that end, we develop a 
simple model of administrative choice, and test that model on two datasets.  We find 
sensible patterns in the data, both in terms of the kinds of properties designated and the 
type of designation chosen.  An implication of the model is that the presence or absence 
of landmarks in a neighborhood cannot be taken as a simple proxy for demand for 
cultural assets.  The designation of a structure as a landmark is the result of an interplay 
amongst the demands of neighbors, the resistance of owners and the administrative 
behavior of the regulator.   Designation choices therefore reflect more than community 
members’ or experts’ assessments of (architectural, historical, etc.) quality from an 
inventory of historical resources.  Stand-out properties in newer neighborhoods tend to be 
protected via single designation, while properties in older neighborhoods tend to be 
protected as part of a large district.  We find evidence that being older makes a structure 
more likely to be individually designated.  Additional cultural significance appears to be 
positively correlated with both individual designation and district or group designation.  
Among historical buildings, a structure’s age is weakly related to the likelihood of 
inclusion in a landmark district unless other cultural variables are controlled for.  The 
results shed light on the administrative decisions historical and cultural preservation 
regulators make, and their selection of policy instruments in a major American city with 
active preservation policy.   
 Further analysis of the robustness of the findings to changes in specification finds 
that the results are on the whole quite robust.  Unfortunately, this analysis is restricted to 
the district model because of the scarcity of individual designations.  Most of the 
independent variables are robust to specification changes.  Those describing the historical 
environment of the structure are especially robust, telling a consistent story across many 
specifications.  Structures in older neighborhoods with fewer protections in place and 
more historical resources are more likely to be protected as districts.  While this may 
seem intuitively obvious, the robustness of these coefficients in the district models gives 
us additional confidence in the coefficients from the more parsimonious multinomial 
logit models.  This further highlights the choices historical preservationists face among 
policy instruments and the way in which different policies are applied.  Hardly the final 
word in explaining why we choose to preserve what we do, this analysis is among the 
first to quantitatively and systematically explain historic designation choices.  Additional 
methods and data would complement this initial investigation well.   
 Latent in the model is a consideration of the supply of historical resources in an 
area, how that supply might evolve over time, and how policy might be used to affect that 
evolution.  Many discussions take a static view, assuming that the supply of heritage 
resources is fixed and only depletable over time.  From a resource economics standpoint, 
whether historical and cultural resources are renewable is a crucial distinction.  Many 
policies appear to cast heritage as a nonrenewable resource, making any changes to the 
stock of heritage irreversible.  Future economic inquiry and empirical analysis of policy 
impacts would do well to view these historic preservation policies in this light and 
examine how the policies are implemented as well as their broader (and possibly 
unintended) consequences.  It might be the case, for instance, that the threat of 
preservation policies could spur owners to redevelop preemptively, as in Turnbull (2002).  
Whether such effects exist, and whether preservation policies are indeed effective in 
actually preserving historical resources are issues the literature has yet to take up.     
 This paper also assesses the usefulness of the CHRS by comparing its results with 
findings from a large sample of all sales of attached homes in Chicago over the 1990s.  
Such samples of sold properties form an important part of the literature assessing the 
effects of policy on the value of housing.  We find that the results from the CHRS are 
fairly robust, with only a few coefficients changing signs significantly across samples.  It 
seems that the revealed preferences for preservation designation among the inventory of 
historically and culturally significant properties in Chicago are not altogether different 
than the decision criteria used for a sample of properties selected less overtly for 
historical significance.  The combination of the historical information with the sales 
information raises the possibility in future work of examining the complicated interplay 
among the value of homes, their historical and cultural significance and the positive 
externality they bestow upon their neighbors.  As many of the variables used in this 
analysis would presumably also be significant in a hedonic price equation, they will 
likely not serve as valid instruments for policy choice.  However, this paper highlights the 
strong possibility of endogeneity bias in the estimation of the effects of designation 
policy on the value of properties designated.  Similar endogeneity problems might also 
complicate the measurement of external effects of such policies on neighboring 
properties not directly affected by the regulation.  Such endogeneity problems are 
extremely important since these external effects of preservation policy are a primary 
justification for preservation policies.  Any examination of the effects of these policies 
must first be grounded in a solid understanding of the causes of these policies.   
 While we find consistent and easily interpretable results for the variables 
measuring the historical and cultural environment of a structure, and many of the 
structure’s own characteristics, the results are less consistent with regards to some 
neighborhood-level factors.  Future work might fruitfully examine exactly how 
neighborhood demographics and preservation policy affect one another.  Whether 
designation is more likely in rich or poor, growing or shrinking, expensive or affordable, 
gentrifying or disintegrating neighborhoods is interesting for a variety of reasons.  As 
these policies restrict property owners, concerns over the economic justice of the 
decisions might be raised.  The causal interaction between neighborhood demographics 
and preservation policy also offer a window into the decision making of preservation 
program administrators, and the effects of those decisions on the neighborhoods they 
regulate. 
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Appendix 
Table A1:  Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definition 
DB90 dummy variable taking a 1 if property is or was in a building designated a 
landmark itself (non-district) after 1990 
DD90 dummy variable taking a 1 if property was in a landmark district designated 
after 1990 
red dummy variable (CHRS code for historical or architectural significance at the 
city, state, or national level) 
orange dummy variable (CHRS code for significance at the community level) 
yellow dummy variable (CHRS code for significance lacking despite good physical 
integrity) 
yellow-grn dummy variable (CHRS code for a lack of individual significance and an 
alteration like artificial siding) 
green dummy variable (CHRS code for over 10% alteration from the original 
appearance) 
purple dummy variable (CHRS code for no significance and extensive alterations) 
blue dummy variable (CHRS code for properties built after 1940, indicates the 
structure was too recent for evaluation) 
begun CHRS sample:  year construction began (missing values replaced with a ‘0’) 
MLS sample:  year built, imputed.a 
nobegun CHRS sample:  dummy variable taking a 1 if yearbuilt is 0. b 
named dummy variable (CHRS has entry for “historic name” field) 
tenant dummy variable (CHRS has entry for “common name/major tenant” field)  
architect dummy variable (CHRS has entry for “architect” field) 
type dummy variable (CHRS has entry for “building type” field) 
style dummy variable (CHRS has entry for “style” field) 
details dummy variable (CHRS has entry for “style: details” field) 
purpose: Res dummy variable (CHRS codes as various residential types) 
purpose: Com dummy variable (CHRS codes as commercial, club, bank, gas station, hotel, 
theater) 
lnArea ln(area of housing unit in feet2), MLS sample only 
units number of units in the building, MLS sample only 
rooms number of rooms, MLS sample only 
bedrms number of bedrooms, MLS sample only 
baths number of baths, MLS sample only 
firepl number of fireplaces, MLS sample only 
parking dummy variable (MLS data indicates a parking spot present), MLS only 
saleyr year of sale of the observation, MLS sample only 
lnICDist ln(distance to industrial corridor) 
lnWaterDist ln(distance to nearest river or lake) 
lnCTADist ln(distance to nearest CTA rail line) 
lnBlvdDist ln(distance to nearest “boulevard”) 
lnCBDDdist ln(distance to State & Monroe downtown) 
latitude decimal degrees north 
fire dummy variable taking a 1 if property in one of two downtown community 
areas that hosted that Great Chicago Fire of 1871 
PerOldLost Reduction from 1980 to 1990 in number of homes built before 1939, as a 
Variable Definition 
percent of pre-1939 homes in 1980* 
dlnInc98 ln(median household income, 1990/median household income, 1980)* 
dlnRent98 ln(median contract rent, 1990/median contract rent, 1980)* 
dlnPopDen population density (pop/mi2), 1990 – population density, 1980* 
dperWhite percent white population, 1990 - percent white population, 1980* 
dperCol percent college degrees, 1990 - percent college degrees, 1980* 
dperPoor percent below 150% poverty line, 1990 - percent below 150% poverty line, 
1980* 
dperDrop percent high school drop out, 1990 - percent high school drop out, 1980* 
lnInc ln(median household income, 1990)* 
lnRent ln(median contract rent, 1990)* 
lnPopDen population density (pop/mi2), 1990* 
perWhite percent white population, 1990* 
perCol percent college degrees, 1990* 
perPoor percent below 150% poverty line, 1990* 
perDrop percent high school drop outs, 1990* 
CountLmk count of designated landmarks (as of 1990) within 1/8th mile (approx. 1 block) 
CountCHRS count of CHRS properties within 1/8th mile (approx. 1 block) 
MedYear median Year of consdtruction of homes in Block group, 1990* 
a Missing yearbuilt values in MLS data imputed using the housing attributes above, ten others (e.g., areas of 
living room and bedroom, story number of unit, basement, garage), and additional geographic controls.  
See Noonan (2007) for a more detailed description. 
b For a discussion of this approach to dealing with missing data, see Longo and Alberini (2006)  
c Median year built from Census data for 1990 for CHRS samples and from a linear interpolation of 1990 
and 2000 Census values (based on year-of-sale) for MLS sample.. 
* Values for the property’s block-group, from Geolytics™. 
 
Table A2:  Descriptive Statistics  
 CHRS Sample MLS Sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
CHRSprop 17366 1.000 0.000 74124 0.050 0.219 
red 17366 0.010 0.098 0 -- -- 
orange 17366 0.557 0.497 74124 0.041 0.198 
yellow 17366 0.144 0.351 0 -- -- 
yellow-grn 17366 0.015 0.123 0 -- -- 
green 17366 0.239 0.427 74124 0.005 0.070 
purple 17366 0.003 0.058 0 -- -- 
blue 17366 0.013 0.115 0 -- -- 
begun* 8125 1904.550 16.901 66419 1957.943 26.992 
nobegun 17366 0.532 0.499 0 -- -- 
named 17366 0.147 0.354 74124 0.009 0.093 
tenant 17366 0.083 0.277 0 -- -- 
architect 17366 0.291 0.454 0 -- -- 
type 17366 0.666 0.472 0 -- -- 
style 17366 0.397 0.489 0 -- -- 
details 17366 0.732 0.443 0 -- -- 
purpose: Res 18441 0.349 0.477 0 -- -- 
purpose: Com 18441 0.062 0.241 0 -- -- 
lnArea 0 -- -- 73787 7.073 0.442 
units 0 -- -- 71222 155.874 237.368 
rooms 0 -- -- 73491 4.677 1.817 
bedrms 0 -- -- 70063 1.906 0.806 
baths 0 -- -- 74096 1.531 0.659 
firepl 0 -- -- 74124 0.295 0.504 
parking 0 -- -- 74124 0.172 0.377 
saleyr 0 -- -- 74122 1995.429 2.804 
lnICDist 16710 -4.698 1.198 0 -- -- 
lnWaterDist 16977 -4.610 0.746 74124 -0.448 0.890 
lnCTADist 16977 -5.208 1.317 74124 -0.729 1.124 
lnBlvdDist 16977 -4.198 1.475 0 -- -- 
lnCBDDdist 16977 -2.715 0.707 74124 1.617 0.903 
latitude 17366 40.929 6.196 74124 41.928 0.051 
fire 17366 0.062 0.241 74124 0.229 0.420 
dlnInc98 16580 0.606 0.463 72385 0.773 0.502 
dlnRent98 16321 0.870 0.273 72008 0.845 0.325 
dlnPopDen 16705 -0.096 0.312 72835 0.031 0.248 
dperWhite 16705 -0.017 0.144 72835 0.008 0.172 
dperCol 16665 0.078 0.116 72835 0.152 0.153 
dperPoor 16588 -0.009 0.162 72525 -0.048 0.165 
dperDrop 16665 -0.098 0.119 76119 -0.114 0.141 
lnInc 16595 10.054 0.642 72632 10.453 0.451 
lnRent 16333 6.066 0.393 72077 6.359 0.317 
lnPopDen 16715 9.663 1.019 73013 10.073 1.167 
perWhite 16715 0.398 0.359 73013 0.719 0.235 
perCol 16715 0.259 0.255 73013 0.474 0.226 
perPoor 16638 0.342 0.232 72772 0.180 0.145 
perDrop 16715 0.338 0.227 76302 0.156 0.149 
PerOldLost 16722 0.077 0.786 72227 0.030 0.577 
CountLmk 18441 0.398 0.822 74124 0.573 0.912 
CountCHRS 16977 38.516 36.592 115648 12.938 20.975 
MedYear 16630 1945.526 11.028 73013 1952.939 13.477 
    
 
Table 1: Landmark status in the two data sets.  
 CHRS   MLS  
 Prop. Freq.  Prop. Freq. 
All Landmarks 0.1994 3462 CHRS Property 0.0504 3603 
Pre-1990 0.1420 2466 District Ever 0.0353 2528 
Post-1990 0.0574 996 District Post-1990 0.0088 627 
Post-1990 Districts 0.0569 966    
Post-1990 Individual 0.0018 30    
Obs 1.0000 17366 Obs 1.0000 71534 
 
 
Table 2: Multinomial logit regression results. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
    Coef. z Coef. z 
In
di
vi
du
al
 D
es
ig
na
tio
n 
orange -1.7196 -3.20  -1.7187 -3.07 
yellow -1.1731 -1.05 -1.2071 -1.11 
lnCBDdist 0.7387 1.83 0.7528 1.68 
Fire 2.0613 1.61 1.9134 1.51 
begun -0.0233 -1.66 -0.0238 -1.71 
FireBegun -0.0011 -1.62 -0.0011 -1.64 
nobegun -46.222 -1.73 -47.131 -1.78 
named 4.7588 4.59 4.7528 4.28 
tenant -0.8051 -1.59 -0.7814 -1.55 
purpose: Res -0.0656 -0.10 -0.1290 -0.2 
purpose: Com 0.6960 1.21 0.7514 1.32 
lnRent 2.7827 2.45 3.4242 3.01 
lnInc -0.3096 -0.61 -0.8256 -1.14 
lnPopDen 0.0374 0.26 0.1369 0.82 
dlnRent   -1.2901 -1.22 
dlnInc   1.0702 1.53 
dlnPopDen   -1.0687 -1.86 
MedYear 0.0459 2.83 0.0544 3.34 
PerOldLost 0.5964 1.41 0.3921 1.63 
CountLmk 0.2836 0.94 0.1654 0.53 
CountCHRS -0.0269 -1.66 -0.0265 -1.64 
Constant -64.804 -1.70 -79.686 -1.95 
     
D
is
tri
ct
 
D
es
ig
na
tio
n 
orange -0.3540 -2.33 -0.5515 -3.58 
yellow -0.1661 -0.99 -0.3473 -1.97 
lnCBDdist -1.3897 -14.84 -1.2197 -10.17 
Fire 1.6819 7.63 1.6457 6.74 
begun 0.0005 0.10 0.0040 0.78 
FireBegun 0.0001 1.03 0.0002 1.12 
nobegun 0.9312 0.10 7.4129 0.76 
named 0.4626 2.72 0.6354 3.79 
tenant -0.5468 -2.27 -0.4987 -2.15 
purpose: Res -0.1327 -0.99 0.1679 1.25 
purpose: Com -0.7223 -3.12 -0.5104 -2.3 
lnRent 1.3298 7.07 2.5855 10.36 
lnInc -1.5466 -10.93 -3.2195 -15.59 
lnPopDen -0.0012 -0.03 0.3042 6.47 
dlnRent   0.3331 1.46 
dlnInc   1.7973 10.88 
dlnPopDen   -0.9432 -6.91 
MedYear -0.0266 -6.24 -0.0369 -8.55 
PerOldLost -0.1643 -5.01 -0.3611 -12.32 
CountLmk -1.9133 -19.42 -1.6100 -17.42 
CountCHRS 0.0612 37.58 0.0586 33.45 
Constant 48.782 3.84 67.030 5.08 
     
 Pseudo R-sq 0.4829 0.5129 
  Observations 13,837 13,832 
 Log-likelihood -1,869.6821 -1,760.6685 
Table 3: Robustness of district model coefficients to additional controls. 
 
Additional History 
Codes Building Details Geography 
Additional 
Demographics and 
Trends 
 Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
red -1.3688 -2.42 -3.7234 -5.42 -2.8324 -3.34 -3.5176 -3.61 
orange -2.7752 -8.47 -4.8001 -9.55 -3.9719 -9.40 -4.0762 -8.80 
yellow -2.6144 -7.67 -4.5871 -9.03 -3.4176 -7.93 -3.5558 -7.59 
yellow_gn -3.6669 -5.34 -5.4607 -6.86 -3.8969 -4.69 -4.2041 -5.13 
green -2.9158 -9.21 -2.9769 -6.57 -2.5341 -6.59 -2.5523 -6.03 
blue 0.4971 0.75 -0.9833 -1.43 -0.7718 -0.83 -1.1483 -1.57 
purple -0.8130 -0.76 -2.6991 -2.28 -2.4036 -2.19 -2.9659 -2.79 
lnICDist     2.9861 16.58 3.5497 10.11 
lnWaterDist     1.5710 8.74 0.8715 4.77 
lnCTADist     -0.0152 -0.21 -0.0312 -0.46 
lnBlvdDist     -0.0169 -0.41 -0.0580 -1.36 
lnCBDDist -1.2523 -9.34 -1.7203 -10.96 -3.8132 -17.48 -4.3107 -18.16 
Latitude     9.8629 4.67 3.0895 1.72 
Fire 1.1638 4.27 0.2576 0.83 -1.2855 -3.82 -2.2237 -5.70 
begun 0.0041 0.81 -0.0095 -1.75 -0.0321 -5.33 -0.0360 -5.24 
FireBegun 0.0005 2.95 0.0006 3.24 0.0003 1.83 0.0004 1.91 
nobegun 7.8082 0.81 -17.743 -1.74 -60.844 -5.34 -68.068 -5.23 
named 0.5887 3.37 0.2402 1.37 -0.0232 -0.11 0.2305 1.03 
tenant -0.4456 -1.95 -0.6325 -2.98 -0.4449 -1.85 -0.4319 -1.71 
architect   0.5113 3.08 0.5376 3.04 0.6354 3.47 
type   0.4620 2.80 0.3414 1.75 0.4228 2.22 
style   -0.2283 -2.02 -0.1929 -1.44 -0.0830 -0.58 
details   3.6503 10.21 2.7991 8.11 2.6385 7.35 
purpose: Res 0.1573 1.16 -0.4522 -3.28 0.3472 1.58 0.6945 2.96 
purpose: Com -0.5923 -2.61 -1.2234 -5.49 -0.8096 -2.81 -0.7412 -2.47 
lnRent 2.7931 9.78 2.3505 8.03 0.0509 0.15 -1.3480 -2.83 
lnInc -3.1558 -14.28 -2.6568 -12.17 -1.9342 -8.22 -0.0490 -0.12 
lnPopDen 0.3529 6.48 0.3988 6.83 0.5832 7.93 1.0340 12.11 
dlnRent 0.3834 1.61 0.5325 2.19 2.5273 8.76 3.0044 7.76 
dlnInc 1.4738 8.50 1.1364 6.27 0.4009 2.16 -2.4584 -6.41 
dlnPopDen -0.9551 -6.61 -1.0509 -6.56 -1.1704 -5.37 -1.4272 -5.53 
perWhite       2.3861 4.91 
perCol       -14.510 -15.77 
perDrop       -7.5945 -7.23 
perPoor       -1.1183 -0.82 
dperWhite       -1.4909 -2.91 
dperCol       10.732 10.13 
dperDrop       -0.9973 -1.01 
derPoor       -2.2000 -2.21 
MedYear -0.0439 -9.17 -0.0490 -9.33 -0.0668 -9.91 -0.0696 -9.32 
PerOldLost -0.3627 -12.81 -0.3332 -10.94 0.0016 0.01 -0.3801 -2.49 
CountLmk -1.8713 -16.44 -1.8804 -15.40 -2.0979 -12.74 -1.6729 -10.07 
CountCHRS 0.0566 31.42 0.0499 26.95 0.0407 18.95 0.0493 18.90 
Constant 80.480 5.86 110.882 7.11 -206.732 -2.19 77.962 0.97 
39 
Pseudo R-sq 0.5433 0.5814 0.6748 0.7109 
Observations 13,832 13,832 13,602 13,602 
Log likelihood -1,562.8301 -1,432.2516 -1,107.5842 -984.66176 
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Table 4: District designation models: robustness to different samples. 
 CHRS MLS 
 Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
CHRSprop   1.5850 6.71 1.3928 5.98 
CHRS*orange -0.9231 -6.61 -1.5503 -5.24 -1.4431 -5.09 
CHRS*green -1.4072 -7.92 -0.5753 -1.49 -0.3129 -0.70 
lnWaterDist 1.1900 9.26 0.3417 1.87 0.5430 2.55 
lnCTADist 0.4147 6.00 0.5938 9.19 0.4681 6.47 
lnCBDDist -2.5312 -14.58 -0.6342 -2.89 -0.8673 -4.08 
Latitude -0.1352 -0.09 -9.6841 -4.12 -11.836 -4.82 
Fire 0.2019 0.76 -11.892 -1.80 -11.097 -1.44 
begun -0.0148 -2.62 -0.0130 -5.48 -0.0114 -4.32 
FireBegun 0.0003 2.07 0.0064 1.90 0.0058 1.46 
nobegun -27.716 -2.59     
named 0.5147 2.64 1.3052 4.95 1.6860 6.20 
lnArea     2.4872 10.77 
units     -0.0043 -5.98 
units-squared     0.0000 5.42 
rooms     -0.0870 -1.22 
Bedrms     -0.2273 -1.31 
baths     -0.9696 -6.15 
firepl     -0.0906 -0.70 
parking     -0.9710 -6.44 
saleyr     -0.0987 -3.34 
lnRent 0.9845 2.59 2.2878 3.83 2.8451 4.33 
lnInc -1.4933 -5.29 5.5425 9.76 5.0395 9.17 
lnPopDen 1.2062 15.34 1.6919 11.36 1.7423 10.33 
dlnRent 1.1052 3.44 1.1463 1.85 0.8000 1.21 
dlnInc -0.7078 -2.66 -7.5869 -12.07 -7.2306 -11.75 
dlnPopDen -1.3984 -8.89 3.5759 7.41 3.3327 7.31 
perWhite 2.4662 7.01 6.3154 9.82 6.3310 9.74 
perCol9 -13.306 -16.77 -17.758 -8.70 -17.468 -8.34 
perPoor 3.5621 3.99 31.347 16.77 30.984 16.75 
perDrop -12.946 -17.88 -11.417 -7.89 -10.980 -7.65 
dperWhite 0.4967 1.25 1.7794 4.04 1.7312 3.42 
dperCol9 10.631 11.86 19.499 7.51 18.912 7.15 
dperPoor -4.4433 -5.85 -26.342 -15.56 -25.167 -15.00 
dperDrop 3.5653 5.06 11.534 5.39 10.465 5.25 
MedYear -0.0652 -9.64 -0.0913 -17.78 -0.0816 -12.53 
PerOldLost -0.3281 -3.83 0.0002 0.00 -0.1111 -1.01 
CountLmk -1.2922 -10.35 -0.3154 -2.95 -0.1166 -0.95 
CountCHRS 0.0630 29.26 0.0735 20.84 0.0760 20.53 
Constant 156.75 2.28 514.15 5.09 765.13 6.34 
PseudoR-sq 0.6028 0.6016 0.6299 
Observations 13,832 61,915 59,381 
Log Likelihood -1,359.1706 -1,340.5757 -1,217.4777 
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